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Competition in Health Care – the Swiss Experience
Peter Zweifel ∗
Introduction
The objective of this contribution is to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of
the Swiss health care system after the new Law on Health Insurance (LHI) that
took effect at the beginning of 1996. The LHI just barely survived a popular refer-
endum. An important argument of the campaign in its favor had been that health
insurance premiums would fall thanks to increased competition between the sick-
ness funds (mutual health insurers). At the same time, the federal government
hoped that its budget would be less burdened by subsidies earmarked for health
insurance. Neither expectation has been fulfilled, not least because Parliament
made the list of benefits covered more comprehensive than ever. Thus, the health
share in the GDP has continued to grow, from 9,5 % in 1996 to some 11 % in
2003 (OECD, 2004).
However, data such as these, while popular in political debates, have limited
relevance for an economic evaluation. Therefore, the criteria used for evaluation
are laid out in the next section. This is followed by an analysis of the first of
the three contractual relationships characterizing an insurance-based health care
system, i.e. that between consumers and health insurers. It is in this domain
that the new Law has brought about several changes. The second contractual
relationship to be evaluated is that between health insurers and providers of health
care services. The issue here is to what extent insurers are capable and also led
by the force of competition to act as prudent purchasers of services on behalf
of their clients. The third contractual relationship is that between the insured
and healthcare providers. An important aspect here is the freedom of choice of
physicians and hospitals, but also the freedom to limit this choice in return for
lower premiums. The final section pulls together the partial results to come to an
overall assessment of the Swiss experience with competition in health care.
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1. Criteria for evaluation
The idea of this section is to apply criteria that have been developed for the
assessment of an economy in general to the health care sector. There is general
agreement about the following criteria for static efficiency (see e.g. Hirshleifer
and Hirshleifer, 1998, ch. 15.2):
1. The goods and services produced should be in accordance with the prefer-
ences of consumers. Applied to the healthcare sector, the services provided
should match the preferences of the insured, who are assumed to decide
about the types of medical care that should be covered by insurance before
they are ill.
2. The economy should display technical efficiency. In the present context,
the health care services that are provided according to criterion 1 should be
produced at least cost.
3. The income distribution should support the attainment of (1) and (2). Ap-
plied to the healthcare sector, providers should not be able to enjoy mo-
nopolistic rents (by closing markets in particular). Otherwise the resulting
prices jeopardize both preference matching and technical efficiency.
Much less agreement exists with regard to a criterion that calls for an equi-
table income distribution. However, the debate about reform of health insurance
and health care centers so strongly around distributional consequences that this
ambiguity shall not be taken as a reason to discard this criterion entirely. For the
time being, it will be stated as:
4. The distribution of healthcare services and its financing should be “accept-
able”. The actual evaluation will depend on the standard adopted. One can
be satisfied by a nonegalitarian solution that guarantees access to health in-
surance regardless of income and wealth, without requiring access to health
care to be fully equal across the entire income and wealth distribution. Or
one can require that use of services or even health status itself be indepen-
dent of income and wealth (egalitarian standard).
Perfect competition is known to result in the satisfaction of criteria 1 to 3.
However, in health care flexible prices like on a spot market would burden in-
dividuals in bad health with excessive transaction costs (seeking out a physician
and negotiating fees). Indeed, the contractual partners (patients, health insurers,
and healthcare providers) may have an interest in fixing fees for a longer period
of time to obviate these costs. Therefore, competition here means the freedom
of the three contractual partners to choose the partners they prefer and to freely
choose the contractual clauses (as long as they are not to the detriment of some
third, uncompensated party).
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2. Institutional framework
The institutional framework needs to be discussed because it defines the ease
with which political decision-makers can limit the contractual freedoms men-
tioned above. Switzerland has three levels of political authority, with their specific
roles in the healthcare sector.
2.1. The confederation
The LHI is a federal law, and thus the confederation is responsible for im-
plementing it. One of the key provisions of this law is a federal subsidy paid
to individuals whose premiums exceed a certain share of taxable income. These
subsidies are matched by cantonal grants (see below) such that no individual shall
pay more than 12 % (in more generous cantons, this level is 8 %) of taxable in-
come. The LHI also has introduced a great deal of choice (to be described below).
On the other hand, it also has reinforced central planning by giving the confeder-
ation the right to impose uniform fee schedules as well as guidelines for hospital
planning (which basically is in the domain of cantonal authority).
Indeed, in 2003, the confederation has introduced the uniform fee schedule
“TarMed” for physician services, which replaces schedules that used to be negoti-
ated at the cantonal level. Thus, a set of uniform solutions has been replaced by
another at a higher level. In a truly competitive system, however, it is the task of
the health insurer to negotiate forms of payment that induce optimal outcomes for
their particular clientele. Contract theory suggests several parameters that should
be present in an optimal payment schedule (Laffont and Tirole, 1993, ch. 1.4);
however, at most two of them seem to be present in the current TarMed formula.
Finally, it should be noted that lawmaking at the federal level is constrained by
popular referendum, as happened in 1995 with the LHI.
2.2. The cantons
The 26 cantons of Switzerland have primary authority in health policy be-
cause they are the main financiers of hospitals. The LHI limits their engagement
to 50 % of operating costs, while leaving them responsible for hospital invest-
ment. Cantons encourage and sometimes enforce the formation of a cantonal
hospital association, with the consequence that health insurers face a monopoly
as purchasers of hospital services. They therefore have created their own can-
tonal association. Hospital payment is uniform within a canton, precluding the
possibility of an insurer devising different forms of payment for its own clientele.
In addition, should negotiations fail, the cantonal government has the authority
économiepublique
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to impose fees. This encourages cantons to engage in quality competition while
shifting the additional cost in part to health insurers and through these to con-
sumers outside the canton in question. Incentives for cantons to engage in a
division of labor with regard to hospital services are therefore rather weak.
2.3. The communes
The approximately 2,900 communes of Switzerland enjoy a great deal of au-
tonomy in general as they can decide about income taxation. However, in the
domain of health care, they are integrated in regional hospital associations that
provide part of investment finance but lack final decision authority, which lies
with the canton. The main task of communes is to subsidize and also often oper-
ate nursing homes.
In sum, the Swiss institutional framework is characterized by a good deal of
direct democratic control. This is a precondition for tying the political process to
voters’ preferences (see line 1 of table 1). On the other hand, there is little pressure
to enforce technical efficiency, and negotiations at the association level are not the
way to prevent monopoly rents in income distribution. The financing of health
insurance is regressive in the sense that high-income insured do not pay the
same share of their income as their low-income counterparts. On this egalitarian
standard, Switzerland does not attain a high mark (see line 4 of table 1).
3. Relationship between consumers
and health insurers
By its very nature, the uniform benefits package does not allow the expression
of individual preferences. The LHI brought about a very substantial expansion
of mandatory benefits which increases the excess burden for some parts of the
population. On the other hand, individuals have free choice among some one
hundred insurers without any involvement of employers at all. In addition, annual
deductibles are available ranging from 230 CHF to 1,500 CHF (approximately
175 e to 1,000 e). Also there is a bonus option offering a maximum rebate
of 45 % after three years without a claim, but with a 10 % solidarity surcharge
on the basic premium. Finally, several insurers offer Managed Care alternatives
ranging from Preferred Providers options on to gatekeeper systems and actual
Health Maintenance Organizations.
Of course, this creates quite a potential for risk selection which may be con-
ducive to technical inefficiency. On the other hand, the premium reductions
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granted for the higher deductible, Managed Care, and bonus options are regu-
lated to values far below actual cost savings achieved. So far, no “death spiral”
has been observed in that a health insurer actually became insolvent because of
adverse selection; however, small insurers with an unfavorable risk structure have
continued to merge with larger ones, and one major insurer had to withdraw from
a few cantons because it accumulated excessive losses there. Effective 1993, there
is a risk adjustment scheme in place, which however is based on age and sex only.
Its purpose is to mitigate the strong incentives for risk selection created by the
LHI which imposes uniform premiums on a given insurer for all adults enrolled
within a given region.
Still, premiums in a given region differ sufficiently between insurers to induce
some migration. The switching rate was highest right after the introduction of the
new LHI but fell to some 2 percent by 2000. However, there is evidence that it has
increased again, to about 5 percent in 2002 (Laske-Aldershof et al., 2004). This
is higher than e.g. in the Netherlands with some 2.5 percent, pointing to a com-
paratively marked degree of premium competition. The price elasticity estimated
from aggregate (market share) data is around -0.5 for Switzerland, which is in the
same range as the -0.3 to -0.4 values found for the Netherlands.
Uniform premiums of course are not compatible with controlling moral hazard
(Zweifel and Breyer, ch. 6.4). Moreover, their distributional merits are ambiguous
in that they benefit not only the sick but also the rich and sick to the extent that
the demand for health care increases with income. In sum, these considerations
may justify the entries in the second column of table 1.
Table 1 : Evaluation of the Swiss healthcare system
Inst. frame-
work
(section 2)
Consumers
and insurers
(section 3)
Insurers and
providers
(section 4)
Consumers
and
providers
(section 5)
Total
(max. = 8)
1. Matching
preferences
2 2 1 2 7
2. Technical
efficiency
1 0 0 1 2
3. No rents
in income
distribution
1 1 0 1 3
4. "Ac-
ceptable"
distribution
in health
care
1 1 2 1 5
Total (max.
= 8)
5 4 3 5
(Note: 0 = not satisfied, 1 = somewhat satisfied, 2 = fully satisfied)
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4. Relationship between health insurers
and service providers
First of all, insurers must contract with domestic providers only. In the case
of physicians, the LHI obliges them to respect an “any willing provider” clause.
However, the LHI contains an exception for Managed Care alternatives. Since
2003, insurers must apply the “TarMed” fee schedule nationwide, which precludes
them from negotiating optimal modes of payment for parts of their clientele with
groups of service providers in fee-for-service medical care, which still accounts for
some 90 % of the market. This is not compatible with the matching of preferences,
technical efficiency, or an income distribution without rents.
However, these criteria are violated to an even greater extent by the cantonal
restriction that contracts cannot be struck with individual hospitals. Except for
fully private clinics, hospitals of a given canton have to negotiate at the associa-
tion level. Moreover, hospital payment is uniform within the canton, the majority
of them still relying on per diems augmented by a fixed payment per case and a
few using a DRG-scheme. Of course, this permits inefficient hospitals to survive
and to continue offering a broad range of services rather than concentrating on
a few specialties. As for the distributional implications, these rigidities have the
advantage of preventing insurers from contracting with providers that would at-
tract rich patients only. On the whole, these considerations motivate the entries
in the third column of table 1.
5. The relationship between consumers
and health care providers
Individuals signing up for a conventional policy have free choice of physician
nationwide and free choice of hospital within the canton of residence. However,
they also have the freedom to limit this choice in exchange for a lower premium
by opting for one of the Managed Care alternatives, which contract with selected
physicians only. Health insurers so far have refrained from providing information
on physicians or hospitals that would facilitate these choices.
Of course, this freedom creates the suspicion that the actual delivery of health
care might be pro-rich. A first indication to the contrary is the finding that
the number of physician visits does not depend on immigrant status, employ-
ment status or education once health status is controlled for (Winkelmann, 2002).
Moreover, the concentration index used by Doorslaer et al. (2002) to reflect the
degree of inequality in the provision of health care with respect to income shows
no 14 - 2004 / 1
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that Switzerland is slightly pro-poor in terms of GP visits, being in the same camp
as Denmark, Germany, and Austria (see table 2). In the year 1997 (shortly after
the introduction of the new law), there is no evidence of the distribution of GP
visits becoming less pro-poor compared to 1982, rather to the contrary. When it
comes to specialist visits, the countries of the sample tend to turn slightly pro-
rich. Switzerland shares this tendency to a rather lesser degree, with no change
visible in 1997, right after the introduction of the LHI.
However, the distribution of poor health is pro-poor in Switzerland and has
become even more so after the injection of more competition by the LHI. This
suggests that the incidence of ill health continues to be concentrated among the
lower income groups, but that this has little to do with the distribution of medical
care among income groups. On the whole, the distribution of medical care, while
not as pro-poor as in the United Kingdom, is not as regressive as judged by some
observers (WHO, 2000), and the increase in competition brought about the LHI
of 1996 does not seem to have changed this. Therefore, the entry in the fourth
column of table 1 can be justified.
Table 2 : Concentration indices, around 1996
GP visits Specialist visits Poor health
cM t cM t cM t
Austria -0.0496 -3.45 0.0360 1.83
Belgium -0.1023 -8.78 -0.0303 -2.46
Denmark -0.0787 -5.24 0.0197 0.72
Germany -0.0631 -5.04 0.0150 1.01
Greece -0.1257 -8.06 -0.0360 -2.15
Ireland -0.1282 -9.39 0.0696 3.02
Italy -0.0642 -3.57 0.0205 1.26
Luxembourg -0.0883 -5.51 -0.0658 -2.51
Netherlands -0.0472 -4.59 -0.026 -1.34
Portugal -0.0696 -5.17 0.0959 3.85
Spain -0.0908 -8.35 0.0248 1.65
Switzerland 1982 -0.063 -3.40 0.001 0.09 -0.059 -5.05
1997 -0.069 -5.42 -0.001 -0.03 -0.073 -7.6
United Kingdom -0.1154 -9.7 -0.0245 -1.12
Canada -0.0795 -11.07 0.0009 0.08
Note: Negative values indicate a pro-poor distribution
Source: Van Doorslaer, Koolman, and Puffer (2002), Leu and Schellhorn (2004)
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6. Conclusions
A rough overall assessment can be derived from the entries in table 1. Of
course, summing the scores implies fixed and equal utility weights on which one
need not agree at all. Still, the total score may indicate what the strengths and
weaknesses of the Swiss health care system are. According to the horizontal
summation, the criterion of matching preferences is satisfied to a high degree
(with 7 out of maximum of 8 points). Swiss consumers and patients are hardly
constrained through the institutional framework or contractual relationships in
bringing their preferences to bear. But then, there is little reason to believe that
those services are produced at least cost. With a score of only 2, lack of technical
efficiency is an important weakness of the system. Likewise, there are several
cartelistic elements in the contractual relationships that permit rents to persist,
creating incentives to perpetuate these conditions that favor the technical ineffi-
ciency just noted. Finally, the available evidence suggests that the distribution of
health care services (somewhat less of health itself) can be judged acceptable with
regard to immigration status, employment status, education, and income (score
of 5).
The vertical summation indicates the elements of the system which contribute
to the relative strengths and weaknesses found. With 5 points, the institutional
framework does not fall too short of the theoretical maximum of 8. The same
holds for the relationship between the consumers as patients and health care
providers. The contractual relationship between consumers and insurers is a some-
what weaker element in the system. However, the lowest mark (of 3 points) not
surprisingly pertains to the contractual relationships between insurers and health
care providers. Insurers’ function as prudent purchasers needs to be strengthened,
but under the important proviso that cartelistic agreements between them are to
be suppressed. This constitutes a major challenge for competition policy as long
as the TarMed fee schedule as well as the prices of drugs on the uniform formulary
continue to be negotiated at the level of the national health insurers’ association
(“Santésuisse”) and hospital rates at the level of cantonal associations.
In 2003, a bill that would have given insurers more freedom in contracting
with physicians in the domain of conventional fee-for-service was dropped in
parliament. At the time of writing (2004), the federal government again is prepar-
ing a revision of the LHI that would relax the any-willing-provider clause with
regard to physicians. The other major restriction, the obligation to contract with
all the public hospitals of a canton, is not likely to be lifted in the near future. This
obligation protects the interests of cantonal governments, permitting them to act
like monopolistic owners of “their” hospitals because of their important financ-
ing role. Without the cantonal hospital subsidies, health insurance premiums of
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course would have to go up, and the simple way to neutralize this increase would
be to raise the premium subsidy paid to consumers accordingly. However, this
implies that at the current 8 to 12 % threshold of taxable income, the majority
of the Swiss population (rather than one-third presently) would receive a subsidy.
To avoid moving money from one pocket to another for many individuals, the
threshold would have to be increased, to e.g. 18 percent of taxable income. How-
ever, at that limit, earning additional gross income would entail such an important
loss of subsidy and hence net income that the incentive effects of the scheme, in
particular on the supply of labor, could not be neglected anymore.
For a small country like Switzerland, the obligation to limit contracting to do-
mestic providers of health care services, pharmaceuticals, and auxiliary suppliers
is also of considerable importance. So far, this “principle of domestic procure-
ment” has been debated in the context of parallel imports of pharmaceuticals
only. However, this principle also prevents Swiss health insurers from contracting
for physician and hospital services in neighboring areas of France, Italy, Austria,
and Germany. First experiences with cross-border contracting are being made in
the domain of complementary insurance. The application of non-discriminating
procurement rules to the health care sector will remain on the agenda for some
time to come.
In conclusion, Swiss politicians and voters are somewhat disappointed by the
effects of increased competition in health care. The main reason is that they
expected to obtain a given basket of health care services at reduced cost. However,
with the high rate of technological change in medicine, this basket changes fast
in favor of therapies that are more highly valued and hence fetch a higher price.
This puts increasing pressure on the system to improve its technical efficiency.
Cantonal governments have the capabilities but lack the incentive to act. Under
the pressure of competition, health insurers have the incentive but still lack the
capability to increasingly become prudent purchasers on behalf of consumers.
Thus, contractual freedom for insurers in conjunction with the prohibition of
cartelistic agreements seems to be the way forward to reap the full benefits of
competition in the Swiss health care sector.
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